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Recent Developments

State v. Lee:
Application of the Inevitable Discovery Exclusion Exception Cannot Make
Evidence Obtained Through an Improperly Executed Narcotics Search
Warrant Admissible
By: Carlin La Bar
he Court of Appeals of possession with intent to distribute
Maryland, in a case of a controlled, dangerous substance.
first impression, held application of
Prior to trial, Lee filed a Motion
to
Suppress
the cocaine, contending
the inevitable discovery exclusion
exception cannot make evidence the no-knock search was invalid
obtained through an improperly because it violated his Fourth
executed narcotics search warrant Amendment rights. The Circuit
admissible. State v. Lee, 374 Md. Court for Harford County denied
275, 821 A.2d 922 (2003). The his motion holding the easy decourt held failure of police to knock structibility of evidence was an
and announce their presence while exigent circumstance justifying the
executing a search warrant that did officers' surprise tactics. Lee
not contain a no-knock clause appealed to the court of special
violated the Fourth Amendment. appeals, which reversed and stated
Id The court further stated, to admit no exigent circumstances existed
evidence obtained in such an illegally and the failure of police to knock
executed search negates Fourth and announce rendered the search
Amendment knock and announce unreasonable. The Court of Approtections and allows officers to peals of Maryland granted certiorari
use forcible entry under any valid to determine if evidence obtained
pursuant to a valid warrant under
search warrant. Id.
In September 1998, a Harford which police failed to knock and
County district court judge issued a announce prior to entry was
warrant for police to search the admissible under the inevitable
home of Kai Ruchell Lee ("Lee") discovery exception to the excluon suspected narcotics charges. sionary rule.
The warrant did not contain a noThe court first discussed the
knock clause permitting surprise knock and announce rule. Id at
entry. In executing the warrant, law 282-91, 821 A.2d at 926-31. Then
enforcement officials entered Lee's the court reviewed the inevitable
home without knocking or an- discovery exception to the exnouncing their presence, searched, clusionary rule, including a disand then seized, inter alia, over cussion of its companion argument,
twenty-six grams of cocaine. the independent source doctrine.
Subsequently, Lee was charged with Id. at 291-316,821 A.2d at 931-

T

45.
The court in Henson v. State
established Maryland's requirement that an officer "give proper
notice of his purpose and authority
and be denied admittance before
using force to break and enter." Id.
at 282, 821 A.2d at 926 (Henson,
236 Md. 518,521-22,204 A.2d
516,518-19 (1964». Some
courts have carved out exceptions
to this general rule in cases where
it was evident that the officer's
purpose was known, or where
announcement would frustrate
arrest, increase peril to the
arresting officer, or permit destruction of evidence. Id. at 285,
821 A.2d at 927. The Henson
court expressly stated narcotics
searches require an element of
surprise entry because, with
opportunity, evidence may be easily
destroyed. Id. The court emphasized that Henson's blanket
exception to the knock and
announce requirement was contrary
to subsequent Supreme Court
decisions and was no longer good
law. Id at 316,821 A.2d at 930.
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of surprise entry
in narcotics cases and a per se rule
allowing surprise entry in Richards
v. Wisconsin, and concluded
34.1 U. Bait. L.F. 37

Recent Developments
police entry requires an element of
reasonableness under the Fourth
Amendment, leaving it to lower
courts to determine reasonableness
on a case-by-case basis. Id. at
286-87, 821 A.2d at 929 (citing
Richards, 520 U.S. 385 (1995)).
The court of appeals reviewed this
reasonableness standard as applied
by other jurisdictions, noting the
Supreme Court had overturned a
blanket exception to the knock and
announce requirement in narcotics
cases. Id. at 286-87,821 A.2d at
928-29.
The court went on to address
the State's contention that the
search warrant was an independent
source for the seizure, separate from
the entry, and the cocaine would
have inevitably been discovered
through execution of the valid
search warrant. Id. at 291, 821
A.2d at 931. The court noted one
purpose of the general rule,
preventing admission of evidence
obtained through the improper
execution of a valid search warrant,
is to reduce police misconduct. Id.
at 297, 821 A.2d at 935.
Conversely, a purpose of the
inevitable discovery exclusionary
rule admitting illegally obtained
evidence is to prevent the prosecution from being placed in a worse
position than it would have occupied
had the search warrant been
properly executed, while precluding
the prosecution from profiting from
improper activity. Id. at 297, 821
A.2d at 933-35. For evidence to
be admissible despite a knock and
announce violation, the prosecution
must show it possesses a source,

34.1 U. Bait L.F. 38

both independent and free of
constitutional violation, which would
have inevitably led to the discovery
of the evidence. Id.
The court cited Maryland
cases that reviewed the inevitable
discovery and independent source
exclusion exceptions, noting admission of evidence discoverable by
means independent of the violation.
Id. at 305, 821 A.2d at 939. The
court then reviewed other jurisdictions' decisions and agreed when
"execution ofthe warrant is illegal,
the State cannot invoke that very
warrant as an independent source
of the illegal entry." Id at313, 821
A.2d at 944. The court agreed with
the reasoning in United States v.
Marts, that with the application of
the independent source exception in
cases of failure to knock and
announce "an officer could obviate
illegal entry in every instance simply
by looking to the information used
to obtain the warrant [and] in
executing a valid search warrant,
could break in doors of private
homes without sanction." Id at 304,
821 A.2dat 939 (citing Marts, 986
F.2d 1216 (8 th Cir. 1993)).
Contrary to the court's comment in Henson, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland noted a
blanket exception to the knock and
announce requirement in narcotics
cases directly opposes the Supreme
Court rejection of a per se rule and
its requirement for a case-by-case
analysis. Id. at 308-09,821 A.2d
at 941. The court of appeals stated
that applying inevitable discovery
and independent source exceptions
removed the knock and announce

requirement from Fourth Amendment protection, permitting unannounced entry under any valid
search warrant. Id. at 316, 821
A.2d at 945. Therefore, evidence
obtained in the search should have
been suppressed. Id.
Prior to this decision, Maryland
was among a minority of states, as
illustrated by the Henson decision.
Henson supported a per se rule in
narcotics cases, which suggested
the mere acquirement of a search
warrant justified any means necessary for entry. Under Henson,
society's protection from criminal
activity was paramount to a private
individual's rights. There is a
balance weighed by some states in
favor of government privileges, but
the court of appeals stressed that in
Maryland, rights ofthe individual are
not secondary. This decision may
affect not only the manner in which
police officers execute search
warrants, but it may also impact
other methods of evidence
acquisition. Some long-standing
accepted methods of investigation,
such as witness or suspect interrogation, may be viewed more
critically in light of this decision,
where the end result does not justify
the means.

